When one driver loses control and crosses into oncoming traffic, can the other driver — or that driver’s employer — share responsibility for the crash because he was going too fast for the conditions?
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed that question in Werner
Enterprises, Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2025), which reversed
a judgment of more than $100 million in a fatal trucking case. It is one of the
most closely watched injury decisions of the last few years, and its reasoning
about causation may reach well beyond trucking.
What happened. On an icy December afternoon in
2014, a pickup traveling east on I-20 near Odessa lost control. In about two
seconds it crossed a 42-foot grassy median and collided with a Werner
18-wheeler in the westbound lanes. The truck was driven by a driver in training,
Shiraz Ali. One child in the pickup was killed, and three other family members
were seriously injured. Id. at 529–31.
There was evidence that the roads were “like a skating
rink,” that Ali had passed several accidents in the hour before the crash, and
that he was driving faster than was safe on the ice, though below the posted
limit. The plaintiffs’ own expert testified, however, that Ali reacted
“appropriate[ly]” in the two seconds after the pickup started across the
median. Id. at 530, 534 & n.2.
Werner admitted that Ali was acting within the scope of
his employment. The jury nevertheless found both Ali and Werner negligent,
assigning 14% of the responsibility to Ali, 70% to other Werner employees, and
16% to the pickup’s driver. Judgment exceeded $100 million. The Fourteenth
Court of Appeals in Houston, sitting en banc, affirmed over four dissents. Id.
at 531.
But-for cause is not enough. Texas negligence law
requires proximate cause. Part of that is “but-for” causation — the
injury would not have happened without the defendant’s negligence. But the
plaintiff must also show that the negligence was a “substantial factor” in
bringing about the injury. On the Court’s framing, that requirement builds in
“the idea of responsibility”: liability falls only on a party who is “actually
responsible for the ultimate harm.” A party whose conduct “merely creates the
condition that makes the harm possible” is not a substantial factor as a matter
of law. Id. at 528, 532–33.
One proximate cause, not two. The Court assumed
that Ali’s speed, and perhaps even his being on the road at all, was negligent.
It also assumed that the crash would not have happened if he had been driving
much more slowly. Id. at 534. But it held that this showed only but-for
causation. “[T]here can be more than one proximate cause of an injury,” the
Court said, but “[t]hat does not mean there is always more than one. On these
facts, we hold that there was only one.” Id. at 534–35.
The Court reasoned that nothing Ali did contributed to the
pickup’s losing control and crossing the median. His truck’s position on the
other side of the highway at that moment was a “happenstance of place and time”
— a condition that made the harm possible, not its cause. The Court added that
if Ali had been going much faster, the collision also would not have
happened. Id. at 535–36.
Why the type of road mattered. The plaintiffs
relied on Biggers v. Continental Bus System, Inc., 303 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.
1957), which upheld a verdict against a speeding bus after a car was pushed
into its lane. The Court did not overrule Biggers, but it distinguished
it on two grounds. Biggers involved a narrow two-lane road, where
entering oncoming traffic is a more familiar risk than on a highway with a
broad median. And the bus driver there had about 3.5 seconds to react, compared
with roughly two seconds here. Id. at 536–38.
As a “practical” matter of “common experience,” the Court
reasoned, drivers rely on one another to “maintain control of [their]
vehicle[s] and to stay on [their] side of the road.” It added that it
“struggle[d] to imagine a scenario” in which the law could fault a driver on
one side of a broadly divided highway for a collision caused by an oncoming
vehicle that crossed the median before he had time to react. Id. at 539.
The employer’s liability fell with the driver’s. The
jury had also found Werner liable on two other theories: that it negligently
trained and supervised Ali, and that it was “directly” negligent in sending an
inexperienced trainee into winter weather without weather updates. The Court
held that both theories depended on Ali’s driving having caused the injuries.
Because it had not, neither could stand. Id. at 539–41. The Court
reversed and rendered judgment for Werner and Ali. Id. at 541.
The separate opinions. The vote was 5–3 on the
outcome. Chief Justice Blacklock wrote for the Court, and Justice Lehrmann did
not participate.
•
Justice Bland, joined by Justices Boyd
and Huddle, agreed that the judgment had to be reversed but would have ordered
a new trial instead of rendering judgment for the defendants. In her view,
there was some evidence that Ali’s speed made the injuries worse. She pointed
to Werner’s own expert, who testified that at 15 miles per hour the truck would
have stopped before the crash, and to a similar collision that day in which a
truck moving at about 5 miles per hour left no one hurt. She also criticized
the jury charge, calling the 84%-to-16% apportionment against Werner
“upside-down.” Id. at 544–55 (Bland, J., dissenting in part).
•
Justice Young, joined by Justice Huddle,
wrote separately about the “admission rule.” Under that rule, once an employer
admits that its employee was acting within the scope of employment, separate
claims such as negligent hiring or training generally should not go to the
jury. The Court did not decide whether Texas follows the rule. Justice Young
wrote that he was “inclined” to adopt it, and that a bare allegation of gross
negligence should not be enough to get around it. Id. at 541–44 (Young,
J., concurring).
What it appears to mean. On the Court’s
reasoning, when a driver loses control and crosses a wide median into oncoming
traffic, the driver who stayed in his own lane and had no real time to react is
unlikely to be treated as a proximate cause of the crash, even if he was
driving too fast for the conditions. Claims against that driver’s employer that
depend on his driving appear to rise or fall with the claim against him.
The opinion also seems to set some limits on its own
reach:
•
It distinguishes narrow two-lane roads and
longer reaction times rather than overruling Biggers.
•
In a footnote, the Court said it was not holding
that the at-fault driver is always the sole proximate cause. It noted
that claims involving a vehicle defect, or conduct that made the injuries worse
(such as a failure to wear a seat belt), may call for a different analysis. Id.
at 536 n.4.
Whether Texas will adopt the admission rule, and
whether a gross-negligence exception will apply to it, remain open questions
that the concurrence suggests the Court may take up in a future case.
See also our post on shipper
liability for motor-carrier accidents, another recent decision about
responsibility for trucking accidents.
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